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In this book Hendricks undertakes the honorable task of bringing together both mainstream 
and formal approaches to the theory of knowledge. His discussion is unified by the concept of 
forcing, which he shows all approaches employ in one way or other to defeat the skeptic. 
After priming the pump in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapters 3-6 discuss mainstream 
epistemologies, in particular Goldman’s epistemic reliabilism, Nozick’s counterfactual 
epistemology, and Lewis’ contextual epistemology. The discussion focuses on the definition 
of knowledge and the skeptical challenge. Hendricks argues convincingly that these three 
approaches try to defeat the skeptic by what he calls forcing: ‘whenever skeptics cite 
possibilities of error as arguments against knowledge claims, the strategy is to show that, 
although they are possibilities of error, they fail to be relevant possibilities of error’ (2). 
Epistemic reliabilism forces by requiring the method of belief acquisition to be merely 
reliable (in a stochastic sense) rather than infallible. Counterfactual epistemology forces by 
requiring that truth is tracked only in worlds close to the actual one rather than in all possible 
worlds. Contextual epistemology forces by properly ignoring possibilities that do not fit the 
context. In addition, these chapters illustrate the difference between a first-person and a third-
person perspective on inquiry. 
The chapters on counterfactual and contextual epistemology refer to various principles 
of epistemic logic, which is dealt with in Chapter 6. Hendricks gives an informed overview of 
the field since the time Hintikka first brought logic to bear on epistemology in the 1960s. By 
showing how the accessibility relation on possible worlds limits the scope of the knowledge 
operator, and thus forces the skeptic, Hendricks develops his main theme. Autoepistemic 
logic, as introduced by the computer scientist R.C. Moore in the 1980s, serves as an example 
of how mainstream epistemology -- in this case G.E. Moore’s autoepistemology -- can 
fruitfully bear on formal epistemology, and vice versa. 
Agency is another important theme. The epistemic agents who have knowledge are 
inactive in first-generation epistemic logic which is based on alethic modal logic. ‘They serve 
as indices on the accessibility relation between possible worlds ... [which] ... will not suffice 
for epistemological ... pertinence simply because there is nothing particularly epistemic about 
being indices’ (101). And another one of the many crispy lines: ‘What bakes the 
epistemological noodle ... is how the agent has to behave in order to gain the epistemic 
strength that he has’ (101-2).  
This brings Hendricks to Chapter 7 and computational epistemology, which is based 
on Kelly’s formal learning theory. While the business of mainstream, as well as logical, 
epistemology is largely conceptual analysis, computational epistemology is a formal account 
of normative or means-ends epistemology. Rather than appealing to intuitions in order to test 
various proposals for a definition of knowledge, computational epistemology investigates 
whether or not a particular method reliably solves a given problem in a certain sense. For 
instance, consider the method that conjectures that all ravens are black as long as only black 
ravens are observed, and otherwise conjectures that some ravens are white. This method 
reliably answers the question whether all ravens are black when the background knowledge is 
restricted (thus witnessing the forcing relation!) to worlds consisting of sequences of 
observations of black and white ravens. The sense in which the method reliably solves the 
problem is called stabilization to the correct answer. If all ravens are black, the method will 
eventually start to conjecture that all ravens are black, and will continue to do so forever. If 
not all ravens are black, the method will eventually start to conjecture that not all ravens are 
black, and will continue to do so forever. Whether the method’s conjectures are intuitively 
appealing is irrelevant for its justification. Rather, the method is justified relative to the goal 
of reliably answering the question because it furthers that goal. This clearly illustrates that the 
justification of a norm is a relation between the norm and a goal that holds to the extent the 
norm furthers the goal.  
Chapter 8 contains Hendrick’s own epistemology. ‘Modal operator epistemology is a 
model of inquiry obtained by mixing alethic, tense and epistemic logics with a few 
motivational concepts drawn from computational epistemology ... It was developed to study 
the acquisition and subsequent validity of limiting convergent knowledge’ (130). In addition 
to these formal ingredients from logical and computational epistemology, modal operator 
epistemology employs the first- versus third-person distinction that is in play in many 
mainstream epistemologies. The tripartite definition of knowledge is turned into the following 
proposal: A method, , ‘may know h in the limit iff there exists a possible world that validates 
’s knowledge of h. In other words: 1. h is true, and 2.  conjectures h after some finite 
evidence sequence has been read and continues to conjecture h in all future’ (139). One of the 
properties a discovery method,  (that actively outputs hypotheses on the basis of finite initial 
segments of evidence streams), may possess is to have consistent expectations. Roughly, if a 
possible world (, k) (consisting of an infinite data stream, , and a state coordinate, k, 
specifying the age of the world) is consistent with what  conjectures on the basis of the first 
n items of the data stream, , then  and  share the first n items and k does not lie in the past 
(139). Thus such a method  conjectures only hypotheses that are consistent with what has 
been observed so far. Based on these notions Hendricks is able to prove that ‘[i]f knowledge is 
defined as limiting convergence, then knowledge validates S4 iff the discovery method has 
consistent expectations’ (141). 
Results like these are important components of ‘plethoric’ epistemology, a 
programmatic view Hendricks puts forth in the concluding Chapter 9. The idea seems to be 
that plethora builds bridges between mainstream and formal epistemologies and, or so I would 
like to add, between conceptual analysis and normative epistemology. Hendricks has a section 
on conceptual analysis (151-4) and is well aware of the distinctive features of normative 
epistemology (Chapter 7). Unfortunately the comparison between these two epistemological 
enterprises remains on a general level. Indeed, given Nozick’s and Lewis’ quasi-formal 
mainstream epistemologies, as well as Hendrick’s quasi-mainstream formal epistemology, 
one starts to wonder whether it is the mainstream/formal distinction that divides contemporary 
epistemology, or whether it is the distinction between conceptual analysis and normative 
epistemology. Still, Hendrick’s book is a must read for both mainstream and formal 
epistemologists. 
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